

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAIRO 01316 01 OF 02 040829 Z

13

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 103377

R 040730 Z MAY 73

FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2989

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 1316

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, XF

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND WAR IN MIDDLE EAST

REF: STATE 082526 (NOTAL) , CAIRO 1291

SUMMARY: OUR SOUNDINGS WITH GOE AND DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES OVER PAST WEEK BEAR OUT SOMBER PICTURE OF PROSPECTS AND EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES WHICH REDIES FOUND A MONTH AGO. SADAT AND GOE AFFECT TO DESPAIR OF US TAKING POSITION OR ROLE IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT, YET, IN CURIOUS WAY, SEEM EQUALLY DESPERATELY TO HOPE US WILL COME AROUND BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE-- MEANING PRODUCE SOME CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITION. GOE OFFICIALS SPEAK OF GRAVE SITUATION AND ONLY REMAINING OPTION BEING MILITARY ACTION; DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES CLOSER TO GOE THAN WE ARE INCREASINGLY TEND TO VIEW THAT THIS MAY EVENTUATE, EITHER BY ADMITTEDLY SELF- DESTRUCTIVE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE, OR BY ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE ACTION PROVOKED BY EGYPTIAN HRETORIC. SOME ALSO SEE POSSIBILITY EGYPTIANS CONTRIVING TO PROVOKE ISRAELIS INTO MOVING FIRST. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAIRO 01316 01 OF 02 040829 Z

1. ASHRAF GHORBAL, IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION, SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ME WITH VERY SERIOUS NATURE OF PRESENT SITUATION AND HOW LITTLE ROOM SADAT HAS LEFT FOR POLITICAL/ DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH NEW MININFO GHALEB, HE GAVE WITHOUT ANY ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ME WHAT WITH HINDSIGHT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FORETASTE OF SADAT'S MAY DAY SPEECH; HE RECAPITULATED EGYPTIAN VIEW OF POLITICAL EVENTS OF 1971 AND 72 CULMINATING IN DISILLUSIONMENT WITH US; NOW, ACCORDING TO GHALEB, SADAT IS GRADUALLY EXPENDING HIS POLITICAL OPTIONS; BUT HE STILL HOPES THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION WILL PRODUCE SOME CHANGE IN THE SITUATION (MEANING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL). GHALEB ALSO WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE ANYTHING LEFT IN THE IDEA OF A PEACE CONFERENCE SUCH AS WALDHEIM HAS MENTIONED. MEANWHILE, HAFEZ ISMAIL IS GOING TO PARIS AND MADRID AND, GHALEB ASSERTED, EXPECTS TO MEET HENRY KISSINGER. (SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV, IN COURSE OF REMARKS DESCRIBED BELOW, ALSO ASSERTED AS FACT THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL AND KISSINGER WILL BE MEETING.)

2. MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO GHALEB (AND ANY MODERATELY PERCEPTIVE OBSERVER), THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN EGYPT AND ESPECIALLY IN CAIRO IS DETERIORATING, SO THAT " SADAT HAS TO DO SOMETHING." UNLESS THE POLITICAL TRACK PRODUCES SOME CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE, ONLY REMAINING CHOICE WILL BE BETWEEN SLOW DEATH AND FIGHTING, EVEN IF FIGHTING MEANS DEFEAT. I OBSERVED TO GHALEB THAT NO GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING USG, CAN BE PUT IN POSITION OF HAVING TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC THREATS, AND THAT USG WANTS TO DO WHAT IT CAN FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT ITS CAPACITY TO BE HELPFUL WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. THEREFORE, I SUGGESTED, IT IS TIME TO COOL SOME OF THE RHETORIC AND EASE THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION, ESPECIALLY SECRET NEGOTIATION. THE TROUBLE WITH PEACE CONFERENCE SUGGESTIONS IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT ALL THE PARTIES WOULD TURN UP, MUCH LESS DO SERIOUS BUSINESS IN SUCH A PUBLIC SETTING. GHALEB RESPONDED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAIRO 01316 01 OF 02 040829 Z

THAT SADAT AND GOE COULD ONLY COOL THINGS NOW IF THEY SAW THE PROSPECT OF AN OUTCOME THEY CAN LIVE WITH.

3. (COMMENT: GHORBAL AND GHALEB ARE, OF COURSE, IN THE BUSINESS OF PURVEYING INFORMATION FOR SADAT AND GOE; EVEN ALLOWING FOR THIS, HOWEVER, ONE IS IMPRESSED BY THEIR GLOOM.)

4. JUST HOW GOE PLANS TO HANDLE FORTHCOMING SC GO-ROUND IS NOT YET CLEAR. IT MAY BE RELEVANT THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV TOLD ME AT POLISH RECEPTION FOR GA PRESIDENT TREPCZYNSKI THAT HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION NOT TAKE MATTERS BACKWARDS. HE THOUGHT JARRING WILLING TO STICK WITH IT DESPITE HIS DISAPPOINTMENTS; HE MENTIONED RE-STARTING 4- POWER TALKS (I DISCOURAGED THIS) AND RE-HEARSED WELL- KNOWN SOVIET AND EGYPTIAN VIEWS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN SETTING FOR SEEKING A SETTLEMENT. YET VINOGRADOV, LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE, WOUND UP ASKING WHAT US IS GOING TO DO THAT' S NEW.

CONFIDENTIAL
NMAFVVZCZ

ADP000
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAIRO 01316 02 OF 02 040845 Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
----- 103544
R 040730 Z MAY 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2990
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 1316

EXDIS

5. SAUDI AMBASSADOR NAZIR AND ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR ANDOM SAY THAT SADAT IS GOING TO MEET KING FEISAL AND ATTEND OAU 10 TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING IN ADDIS FOR AT LEAST A DAY. NAZIR IS TRYING TO WORK OUT WHETHER FEISAL STOPS IN CAIRO ON HIS WAY TO PARIS, WHERE HE IS EXPECTED MAY 14, OR WHETHER SADAT GOES TO SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE THAT DATE, OR ON HIS WAY TO ADDIS. NAZIR THINKS BOTH SADAT AND FEISAL REGARD IT IMPORTANT THAT THEY MEET (ALTHOUGH AS INDICATED BELOW, FOR PERHAPS OPPOSITE REASONS). ANDOM SAID THAT WHEN HE TOOK HIM' S MESSAGE TO SADAT INVITING HIM TO ADDIS, SADAT SAID HE STILL HAS A BAD HEART AND WONDERS WHETHER

HE SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE TRIP TO THAT ALTITUDE, BUT IN THE END SAID HE WOULD.

6. FRENCH, BRITISH AND SAUDI AMBASSADORS

ALL FEEL THAT UNLESS THERE IS SOME BREAK ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THERE WILL BE AN OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING, STARTED EITHER BY EGYPT (IN THIS SET, AFTER SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IF IT IS STERILE, BUT POSSIBLE JUST BEFORE OR DURING IT TO GET EVERYBODY' S ATTENTION) OR, MORE OMINOUSLY, BY ISRAEL. NAZIR ESPECIALLY PROFESSES
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAIRO 01316 02 OF 02 040845 Z

TO READ MRS. MEIR' S STATEMENTS, AND THE PLAY THEY ARE GETTING IN EUROPE, AS HERALDING PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE STRIKE STIMULATED BY EGYPTIAN RHETORIC AND MILITARY MOVEMENTS , ON THE MODEL OF 1967. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR STANSFIELD SAYS EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS IN CAIRO THINK ISRAELIS WILL START THE SHOOTING; THESE DIPLOMATS FORESEE IT HAPPENING IN JUNE.

7. NAZIR, ALWAYS WELL- CONNECTED WITH THE PRESIDENCY HERE AND NORMALLY CHEERFUL, SAYS THAT SADAT IS FEELING INCREASINGLY DESPERATE AND HAS TO DO SOMETHING. NAZIR THINKS SADAT HOPES A MILITARY ACTION COULD BE KEPT ON A SMALL SCALE. HE ALSO MAKES MUCH OF STORIES HE SAID ARE CIRCULATING IN BEIRUT THAT NOT ONLY THE ISRAELIS BUT EVEN THE AMERICANS ARE WILLING TO HAVE A FIGHT BREAK OUT, TO TAKE EGYPT DOWN A FEW MORE PEGS AND, IN THIS THEORY, MAKE THEM MORE LIKELY TO KNUCKLE UNDER. I DISCLAIMED ANY SUCH AMERICAN VIEW AND EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF CEASEFIRE HOLDING IF DIPLOMATIC TRACK IS TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF SUCCESS.

8. NAZIR SAID FEISAL THINKS THE RHETORIC AND THE SITUATION HAVE TO BE COOLED AND WANTS TO DO WHAT HE CAN TO INFLUENCE SADAT IN THAT DIRECTION; ONE ADVANTAGE FEISAL SEES TO TALKING TO SADAT BEFORE HE TALKS TO POMPIDOU IS TO PUT POMPIDOU IN A POSITION TO TAKE HIS VIEWS TO PRESIDENT NIXON. (AGAIN, ALL ROADS LEAD TO WASHINGTON.) BUT NAZIR SAYS THAT, FROM VIEWPOINT OF PERSUASIVENESS WITH SADAT, COUNSELS OF RESTRAINT SO FAR HAVE NOT SHOWN HIM A POLITICALLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO HOSTILITIES, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE LATTER; WHAT HE IS LOOKING FOR IS HELP, NOT RESTRAINT. I REPEATED TO NAZIR AT SOME LENGTH RATIONALE FOR KEEPING THE PEACE.

9. INCIDENTALLY, NAZIR THINKS SADAT IS GRADUALLY DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM THE SOVIETS; HIS INTEREST IN WESTERN- EUROPEAN- ASSISTED DEFENSE PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN EGYPT IS ONE EVIDENCE OF THIS. NAZIR SAID HE

THOUGHT SADAT MIGHT EVEN ABROGATE SECURITY TREATY WITH
SOVIETS, BUT DID NOT PRESS THIS POINT WHEN I EXPRESSED
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAIRO 01316 02 OF 02 040845 Z

DOUBT.

10. POSTSCRIPT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS SAYS THAT
WHEN HE SAW ZAYYAT LAST WEEK HE FOUND HIM GLOOMY AND
SEEING NO PROSPECT FOR ANYTHING BUT RENEWED FIGHTING.
THIS CONVERSATION WAS OCCASIONED BY ZAYYAT CALLING
ADAMS IN TO BRACE HIM ABOUT AFP REPORT OF MAARIV
STORY THAT RAF HAD SPOTTED MIRAGES AND HUNTERS ON
EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS. ZAYYAT'S QUESTIONS TO ADAMS WERE:
WHAT IS RAF DOING FLYING OVER EGYPT AND WHY DID HMG
TELL ISRAEL? (ZAYYAT DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF WHEREABOUTS OF THE
AIRCRAFT.) ADAMS PREEMPTIVELY DENIED AFP STORY. IN
TELLING ME OF THIS, ADAMS ADDED THAT HMG DOES NOT IN
ANY EVENT NEED RAF TO HELP THEM KNOW THAT THE MIRAGES
AND HUNTERS-- FROM IRAQ-- HAVE BEEN AT TANTA.

11. ADAMS ALSO SAYS THAT AS PART OF FCO POST MORTEM
ON LAST SECURITY COUNCIL EXPERIENCE, SPECIALLY ITS
STRESSES IN US/ UK RELATIONS, PARSONS HAS CALLED FOR
NEW IDEAS FROM BRITISH AMBASSADORS IN MIDDLE EAST,
AS PRELIMINARY TO CONSULTING AMERICAN AND FRENCH
GOVERNMENTS BEFORE NEXT SC MEETING.

12. ACCOUNT OF MY MAY 3 CONVERSATION WITH ZAYYAT
IN SEPTTEL.
GREENE

CONFIDENTIAL
NMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973CAIRO01316
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730536/aaaahwjw.tel
Line Count: 259
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 73 STATE 082526 (NOTAL), 73 CAIRO 1291
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <08-Aug-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <10-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 971209
Subject: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND WAR IN MIDDLE EAST
TAGS: PFOR, EG, XF
To: AMMAN
BEIRUT
BONN
JIDDA
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
TEL AVIV

USUN

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005